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2Abstract
Market integration is studied for Dutch stocks cross-listed at the NYSE. Trading starts in
Amsterdam and ends in New York with a one-hour overlap. Both markets are not perfectly
integrated in that they can be viewed as one market with the well-documented U-shape in volatility,
volume and spread. Increased values for the hour of overlap suggest informed trading. Zooming in
on this hour, markets are integrated in that price discovery on both sides of the Atlantic reflects the
same underlying, new information. Not consistent across all stocks is the origin of this information,
Amsterdam, New York or both.
31 Introduction
An asset’s price is unaffected by its location of trade. This classic finance paradigm predicts that
claims on the same set of risky cash flows are assigned the same value irrespective of the
international markets these claims are trading at. In other words, markets are perfectly
integrated. A recent empirical study by Froot and Dabora (1999) shows that this is not true for
three of the world’ s largest and most liquid companies.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of market integration for Dutch blue chip stocks
that are cross-listed at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The data set consists of all bids,
quotes and trades from July 1997 to June 1998. Included are two of the three stocks studied by
Froot and Dabora (1999): Royal Dutch and Unilever. The main contribution of this paper is that it
adds an intraday perspective to market integration for markets as geographically distinct as
Europe and the US. The one-hour trading overlap facilitates study of market integration. Although
many event studies have looked at the effects of the start of cross-listing (IPO), still relatively little
is known about mature trading in both markets. A basic understanding of such trading is
increasingly important since not only do companies consolidate at a global level, they also raise
capital in foreign equity markets by cross-listing their shares. As an example, figure 1 depicts the
number of non-US companies listed at the NYSE from 1956 to 1998.  This number has grown
exponentially which has resulted in 379 cross-listings at the end of 1998. The surge of Electronic
Communication Networks (ECN) as still another trading platform will add to this growth in
dispersed trading of securities as does the trend to extend trading hours amongst the established
exchanges. The Dutch data set is tailored to study of mature trading for cross-listed stocks, since
it includes stocks such as Royal Dutch and Unilever that arguably represent the most mature
level of US trading a non-US stock can achieve. Both stocks enjoy highly liquid trading in New
York, they are registered shares as opposed to ADRs and they are members of the S&P500.
Amsterdam and New York have the potential of being integrated for a number of reasons.
First, both Amsterdam and New York are open trading platforms with virtually complete access for
foreign investors. Second, no regulatory constraints prevent cross-border arbitrage in cross-listed
stocks. Third, Dutch cross-listed stocks are liquid in both Amsterdam and New York trading.
Fourth, since Amsterdam and New York trade the same stock for one hour each day, market
makers and brokers face considerable cross-Atlantic competition for order flow. The NYSE is likely
to meet tough competition from Amsterdam since broker commissions are amongst the lowest in
Europe.
Market integration is assessed both indirectly through the study of intraday patterns and directly
by modelling price discovery during the overlapping trading hour.
The indirect assessment builds on Werner and Kleidon (1996) who study UK stocks cross-
listed at the NYSE. To the best of our knowledge this is the only intraday study on integration for
stocks trading in different continents. Other papers have either studied intraday co-movements of
4entire markets, Goodhart and O’Hara (1997), or have modelled individual stocks using close to
close returns, e.g. Froot and Dabora (1999). Well-known drawbacks of the latter approach are a
potential bias due to heavy last minute trading -- Amsterdam is a clear-cut example -- and
imperfect synchronisation due to different closing times.
The direct assessment of market integration is based on price discovery during the hour of
trading overlap. The model developed in Hasbrouck (1995) is used to study the extent of market
integration and the origin of information. The remainder of the introduction will elaborate on
these two approaches.
Indirect Assessment of Market Integration
If markets are perfectly integrated and trading overlaps at some point in time, the intraday
patterns in volatility, volume and spread for both markets combined should resemble the U-shape
documented for single markets. Such indirect assessment of market integration is done for UK
stocks cross-listed at the NYSE in Werner and Kleidon (1996). The current paper takes the same
approach for Dutch stocks cross-listed at the NYSE. The current data set, however, is more
tailored to the study of market integration, because the Amsterdam and New York market are
institutionally more comparable. The London Stock Exchange is a dealer market, whereas the
NYSE is not. Although the NYSE has a trading floor, it is not a pure dealer market, because many
orders arrive at the floor via the electronic Superdot system, which resembles an auction market.
The specialist matches orders from both the floor and the system and, if necessary, takes
inventory to meet his exogenous objective of 'smooth' price discovery. The most relevant difference
between a dealer and an auction market pertaining to the present study is the level of
commitment to bid and ask quotes. In auction markets, issuing a quote is similar to writing an
option, because of the inherent commitment to a trade at the quoted price. Whereas the best
quotes in New York are disciplined by the Superdot system, the best quotes in London are at most
indicative. Hence, quoted spreads in New York are more likely to reflect the real cost of trading.
Amsterdam and New York are institutionally comparable, because both markets resemble
an auction market with a specialist supporting trade. In Amsterdam, the specialist or ‘hoekman’
does not oversee a trading floor, but supports trading in an electronic market. All quotes issued
are quotes that traders commit to. It is not a pure auction market, because the specialist still
provides liquidity if necessary. These differences in market structures are reflected in the results.
Whereas Werner and Kleidon could not discriminate any immediate change in London quoted
spread upon of the opening of New York, this study can.
In their review of the high frequency literature in finance, Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) consider
the U-shape pattern in volume, volatility and spread as the best known stylised fact. The
intriguing feature of these intraday patterns is that they are difficult to explain theoretically, at
least using basic models that split agents in informed traders, uninformed or liquidity traders and
market makers (Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 1989)).
5The latter model is in the spirit of Kyle but further sophisticates liquidity traders into
discretionary and non-discretionary. The group of non discretionary traders must trade a given
number of shares in a certain time interval e.g. fifteen minutes, whereas discretionary liquidity
traders can choose when to trade, but have to trade within a pre-specified larger time interval e.g.
the full day. The Nash equilibrium of this trading game is such that trading volume is
concentrated and may take place at any time in the trading day. This high volume time interval is
further characterised by high volatility, since it attracts all discretionary traders including the
informed.
Theoretical models can explain the empirical U-shape patterns for volume and volatility,
but cannot explain a similar pattern in spread. On the contrary, the Admati and Pfleiderer model
predicts an inverted U if the intraday volume pattern is U-shaped, since the high volumes exist for
reasons of lower spreads! Most likely the assumption of discretionary traders is flawed. The
theoretically less rigorous model of Brock and Kleidon (1992) shows that transactions demand at
the open and close of trading is stronger and less elastic than at other times of day. At the open,
there is a strong demand for two reasons. First, public news announcements prior to the open
provoke trade. Second, the need to rebalance portfolios based on intensive price discovery at the
previous day’s market close is another trigger for trade. Similarly, when prospective market
closure foreshadows an inability to readjust portfolios for 17 hours overnight and over 60 hours
on Friday night, investors are focused on the need to rebalance before the closed period arrives.
The Brock and Kleidon model is used to hypothesise intraday patterns for stocks listed on
exchanges in different time zones. If both markets are perfectly integrated and have some, not
necessarily long, trading overlap, intraday patterns will be U-shaped for the overall trading period.
The null hypothesis of complete integration is depicted in figure 2.
The hypothesised overall U-shape pattern needs further sophistication triggered by a
strand of literature referred to by O’Hara (1995) as ’Information and Multimarket Activity’. She
classifies information as systematic and non-systematic. The non-systematic information pertains
to one single security only, whereas the systematic information pertains to all securities
combined, i.e. the market. The opening of the US market potentially reveals systematic
information. Lin (1991) has summarised previous studies in this field which show that movement
in the US market affects other markets, but not vice versa. Fortunately, the systematic and non-
systematic information from US trading can be discriminated, since they start to be revealed at
different times. One hour prior to the opening of New York trading, systematic information is
revealed through the start of US index futures trading and through US macro economic
announcements. The opening of New York then allows for non-systematic or private information
to be revealed through the start of trading in the individual cross-listed Dutch stocks. These
observations require further sophistication of the null hypothesis of market integration. The
systemic information disclosed one hour prior to the opening of the NYSE is expected to affect
trading in Amsterdam through increased volume, volatility and spread. The perfect market
integration hypothesis, however, does not allow new, private information to be revealed through
6the start of trading in the individual stocks at the NYSE open, since this information should have
been incorporated through trading in Amsterdam. Hence, the null hypothesis is an overall W-
shape pattern for volatility, volume and spread with a peak at 14:30 Central European Time
(CET), since this is the time when systematic US information is revealed.
The empirical evidence for Dutch cross-listed shares rejects the hypothesised perfect market
integration. Although all three legs of the W-shape pattern are evident, the start of US trading in
the cross-listed shares adds a fourth leg. For Amsterdam the volume, volatility and spread clearly
show a jump one-hour prior to the opening as well as at the opening of New York. Apparently the
start of trading at the other side of the Atlantic does have informational consequences that
provoke increased volume.  If there were no new information, the higher volumes should have
been accompanied by lower spreads. A jump in volatility and foremost a significant jump in
spread suggests increased informed trading. Through high spreads the market can offset the
expected loss vis-à-vis informed traders. The jump is more prominent for quoted spreads as
compared to effective spreads, since the price of the option element contained in the bid and ask
quotes is high in times of high volatility. In line with the results for Amsterdam, the overlapping,
first hour of trading in New York is characterised by increased volume and volatility as can be
inferred from the substantial drop upon the Amsterdam close. Remarkable is the jump in spreads
upon the Amsterdam close as opposed to an expected drop due to less informed trading.
Apparently, the competitive pressure provided by simultaneous trade in Amsterdam disappears
and spreads jump. An alternative explanation is that extreme volume and volatility at literally the
last minute in Amsterdam affect trading in New York afterwards. Informed traders that did not
succeed to trade at the Amsterdam close redirect their intended trading to New York. This
argument is less credible, since, in that case, price volatility in New York should have jumped
after the close in Amsterdam.
Direct Assessment of Market Integration
The increased volume and volatility for the hour of overlap accompanied by higher spreads clearly
reject the hypothesised intraday patterns for perfectly integrated markets. These findings are
consistent with informed trading for this time of day. But if markets are not perfectly integrated as
judged from a full-day perspective, are they integrated for the hour of trade overlap? Do prices
reflect the same fundamental information, or, alternatively, is price discovery integrated for this
hour? Price differentials may exist but should be transient for arbitrage reasons. In econometric
terms, both price series may be non stationary, the price difference series should be stationary.
The null hypothesis of market integration during the overlap is tested by evaluating whether or
not both price series are cointegrated.
If volume is high, prices are volatile, spreads are large indicating informed trading and if
price discovery is integrated, arguably the most interesting question is: in which market does this
new, private information originate? Hasbrouck (1995) has developed a practical econometric
7approach based on an error correction model to answer this question. In addition, model
estimates yield impulse response functions that are informative on the long-term effect of a unit
impulse on one of the exchanges and the adjustment rate of the other exchange.
Model estimates based on five-minute midquote returns show that both prices series
shares are indeed cointegrated for all shares and, hence, markets are integrated by definition.
Interestingly, results on the origin of information are mixed for Dutch stocks. Some stocks are
clearly led by Amsterdam in the overlapping trading hour which means that information primarily
originates in the Dutch market, some are led both by Amsterdam and New York, some are led
solely by New York.
The results of both approaches to market integration show that markets are not perfectly
integrated in that they can be viewed as one market open from 9:30 CET until 16:00 EST. The
reason for this is that volume, volatility and spreads for all stocks during the overlapping trading
hour are substantially higher than what is predicted based on well-documented U-shape patterns
for single markets. Zooming in on this relatively intense trading during the overlap, markets
appear to be integrated in that price discovery on both sides of the Atlantic reflects the same
underlying new information. Price differentials exist but are transient.
The remainder of the paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 describes the setting and
introduces the model to estimate the intraday patterns. Section 3 documents the intraday
patterns for volatility, volume and spread for both markets. In section 4 price discovery for the
overlapping trading hour is modelled. Section 5 re-estimates the intraday patterns based on a
stratification of the stocks based on the results of section 4. Section 6 concludes the paper with a
brief discussion of the results.
2 The Setting: Amsterdam and New York
This study is based on trade and quote data from the Amsterdam stock exchange (AEX) and the
NYSE for July 1, 1997 through June 30, 1998. Seven Dutch blue chip stocks cross-listed in New
York have been selected for the current study: Aegon, Ahold, KLM, KPN, Philips, Royal Dutch and
Unilever. Although three other Dutch companies were also cross-listed at the time, they are not
included because of too short trading history in New York.
CET 9:30 14:30 15:30 16:30 22:00
EST 3:30 8:30 9:30 10:30 16:00
Amsterdam opens Start US Index
Futures Trade/ US
Macro Economic
Announcements
New York opens Amsterdam closes New York closes
8The timetable for Amsterdam and New York trading in the sample period shows that there is a
one-hour trading overlap each day. In 1997 the end of daylight savings time for the Netherlands
and the US coincide. In 1998, however, the start of daylight savings time for the Netherlands is
one week prior to the US start. This implies that there is no trading overlap from March 30th to
April 3rd, 1998. This week will be studied to further test the results and explanations developed in
the paper. Another relevant event for the timetable is the US macro economic announcements and
the start of US index futures trading one hour prior to the opening of the NYSE.
Summary statistics for the seven Dutch stocks are tabulated in the first table. The
companies are highly diverse, since they differ in terms of industry, number of outstanding shares
and market capitalisation. Trading in Amsterdam is more active than in New York when looked at
the average numbers of trades and quotes per day. The relative activity for the stocks in
Amsterdam compared to New York in terms of ratios ranges from 1 to 20. The diversity is also
reflected in the means for the trading variables studied in this paper which are volatility, volume,
quoted and effective spread. Definitions and calculations of these variables are enclosed as an
appendix. Apart from these marked differences, a closer look shows some striking similarities.
First, for none of the stocks New York has been able to attract more volume than Amsterdam.
Second, remarkable is the consistent increase of New York market share measured in terms of
number of trades as compared to volume. Apparently, the average volume per trade is smaller in
New York. This is opposite to Werner and Kleidon (1996) who find higher average volume per trade
in New York as compared to London. Third, consistent with New York not being a complete
auction market, quoted spreads are up to almost 300% higher in New York. A more comparable
measure of cost of trading is the effective spread. It is widely used as an ex-post measure of cost
of trading, since it is based on actual trades. It is defined as twice the difference between the
transaction price and the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask quotes. Evaluating effective
spreads clearly puts Amsterdam and New York more in line. For Philips, Royal Dutch and
Unilever spreads in New York are lower. This result should be interpreted with care, since average
volume per trade, for example, is larger in Amsterdam. Hence, the average trade potentially bites
deeper into the limit order book and therefore meets a higher effective spread. Although
determining which exchange is more competitive is beyond the scope of this paper, effective
spread results show that exchanges are indeed competitive which is a promising result in view of
the integration questions addressed in this study.
Comparing Amsterdam to New York based on statistics for the overlapping hour results in
a similar picture. Still, there are some differences. The averages for all variables are higher, in
particular for volatility and volume. During the hour of overlap the average volatility for
Amsterdam and New York is almost equal, contrary to the full day results which show substantial
lower average volatility for New York. This is the first sign of co-moving prices at the overlapping
trading hour. At the same time, this result implies that price changes for the rest of the day in
New York are relatively small suggesting less intense price discovery.
9Although studies that focus on intraday patterns are numerous and consistently document U-
shape patterns, the comparison of patterns for cross-listed stocks is limited. Werner and Kleidon
(1996) are the first to study market integration through intraday patterns. Their approach is used
for the current sample because it both allows for the strong firm-specific effects and it offers a
benchmark. The intraday patterns for volatility, volume and spread are estimated using ordinary
least squares regressions. In order to estimate a cross-section model incorporating all stocks, the
variable of interest is scaled to make up for firm-specific means. The series }{
,, tdsX , where X is
either volatility, volume or spread, where subscript s denotes the specific stock, d denotes the day
and t denotes a specific fifteen minute interval, is scaled by the stock-specific, day-specific mean
ds,ω .
The scaled series }{
,, tdsY is used in a cross-section regression to estimate the intraday patterns.
The model is defined as:
The intraday patterns are incorporated in the α vector, )(tI j takes the value one if tj = and zero
otherwise. The tds ,,ε  is an identically and independently distributed error term with zero mean and
unit variance. By construction, the intraday variance is allowed to be heteroskedastic and is
reflected in the σ vector. Such heteroskedasticity is likely because of the U-shape pattern and was
found in the Werner and Kleidon study. This time of day specific variance will prove useful in
testing whether intraday patterns in Amsterdam significantly differ from the average pattern in
London. In addition, it enables statistical testing of sudden jumps or drops in a straightforward
manner. Going from time interval j to j+1 the model not only allows for a new intraday average,
but also for a confidence interval solely based on the day over day volatility for that particular
fifteen minutes of the day. Effectively, it makes the results more robust to outliers, since these will
not only affect the interval average but also enlarge confidence intervals for that specific interval.
3 The intraday patterns
The empirical intraday patterns for volatility, volume and spread are estimated and discussed in
this section. The model estimates are tabulated in table 2 and depicted in figure 3a and 3b.
tds
T
tj j
tjIj
T
tj
tjI
tdsY ,,
0
))(()
0
)((
,,
εσα ⋅






∑
=
⋅+






⋅∑
=
=
(1)
(2)
ds
tdsX
tdsY
,
ˆ
,,
,, ω
≡
10
3.1 Amsterdam
The trades and quotes sample for Amsterdam is comprised of 261 trading days, which yields
7,308 fifteen-minute intervals. The inclusion of seven stocks in the sample thus results in 51,156
observations. The number of explanatory variables is 28, which is the number of fifteen-minute
intervals in a day.
3.1.1 Volatility
The intraday volatility pattern in Amsterdam is determined by modelling fifteen-minute squared
returns, which are based on trade prices. The empirical intraday pattern has the familiar U-
shape, although somewhat distorted. The first remarkable difference with a pure ‘U’ is the sudden
jump from 0.73 to 1.13 at 14:30 CET. Volatility jumps by more than 50%, which indicates that
US macro-economic announcements and the start of trading in US index futures reveals new
information for Dutch stocks. These relatively large price changes from 14:30 to 14:45 are clearly
larger than justified by the “U” shape. The second jump is at 15:30 showing an increase in
volatility from 0.90 to 1.31, which is another jump of almost 50%. The New York open apparently
moves the stocks in the Amsterdam market. Volatility drops by a similar percentage at 16:00 but
then, in the final fifteen minutes, jumps to record levels at the close. This end-of-the-day effect
shows prices either jump or fall to an extent not witnessed throughout the day. The 99%
confidence intervals show that these sudden changes in volatility are firm results, since these
intervals are small compared to the size of the change. The ratio of the 14:30 jump to the
standard error for the interval starting at 14:30 is 8.4. The same ratio for 15:30 is 8.8.
Comparing the intraday volatility patterns of Amsterdam to the London patterns reported
in Werner and Kleidon (1996) reveals some remarkable differences. The Amsterdam pattern is
relatively easily understood for the jumps are smooth and occur at meaningful times. The London
pattern, on the other hand, is relatively irregular with unexpected jumps and drops. Although the
Amsterdam pattern is significantly different from the average London pattern, this result should
be interpreted with care. The irregularity of the London pattern might be the result of a poor
model fit for London and this pattern thus will be accompanied by wide confidence intervals. The
jump in volatility at the New York open is evidenced in both samples, whereas Amsterdam is
unique in showing a volatility jump one hour prior to the New York open.
3.1.2 Volume
The volume pattern is determined by studying the total number of shares traded in each fifteen-
minute interval. The volume pattern closely resembles the volatility pattern: a U-shape with jumps
at 14:30 and 15:30 and a drop at 16:00 to be followed by a record volume at the close. Although
the jump at 14:30 is more restricted, 25%, the jump at 15:30 is comparable in size with the
volatility jump, 50%. The intraday volume and volatility patterns combined clearly reject the
hypothesis of perfect market integration, since under this hypothesis the 15:30 jump in volatility
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and volume would not exist. Both jumps are significant, since the jump to standard error ratios
are 9.6 and 20.8 for 14:30 and 15:30 respectively.
The comparison to the intraday patterns for the UK sample shows that London volume
and volatility do not jump on the 14:30 events in the US, whereas they do at the actual open of
the NYSE, but to a lesser extent. In other words, the Dutch cross-listed stocks appear to be more
sensitive to US events and NYSE trading.
3.1.3 Quoted Spread
The quoted spread pattern resembles the volatility and volume patterns with the exception of a
relatively small jump at the close. At 14:30 the quoted spread jumps by 10% and the 15:30 jump
is 5%. The spreads in the final two hours of trading are 5% to 10% higher than the previous
hours. These results indicate that market participants in Amsterdam are quoting more carefully
to protect themselves against informed trading. Both jumps are significant, since the jump to
standard error ratios are 12.1 and 8.4 for 14:30 and 15:30 respectively.
The comparison with London shows that the London results do not show any sign of
higher cost of trading as indicated by increased quoted spreads, on the contrary, the start of New
York trading reduces the already declining spreads in London. The other remarkable difference is
the steady decline in quoted spreads in the first few hours of trading in Amsterdam from 1.58 at
the start to 0.91 at noon. The London quoted spreads start at 1.10 and rapidly drop to 1.03 in the
first hour of trading and then gradually decline to a level of 1.01 at noon. The lack of commitment
to quotes in the London dealer market can explain why the London patterns are less pronounced.
Quotes, for example, do not need to jump on the US market open, since dealers are not committed
to their quotes should market prices start to move strongly as a result of informed trading.
3.1.4 Effective Spread
The remedy against the drawbacks associated with quoted spreads is to revert to ex-post
measures of trading cost. Apart from the indicative character of quoted spreads in London, there
are two other drawbacks associated with quoted spreads. First, the best bid and ask quote might
not be backed by volume. If volume for these quotes is relatively small and the limit order book is
not deep, a large sell order, for example, can only be executed by biting deep into the order book.
Only part of the total order can be executed at the best bid, the rest is executed against less
favourable bid prices. On the other hand, trades might take place within the bid ask spread,
because both buyer and seller might offer some margin to establish a trade. These are the main
reasons for studying the ex-post, effective spread which is defined as twice the distance from the
trade price to the midquote based on the best bid and offer at the time of the trade.
The shape of the intraday effective spread pattern is identical to the quoted spread pattern.
This strengthens confidence in the results documented for the quoted spread. Cost of trading
increases with the opening of the US market with a 10% and 5% jump in effective spread at 14:30
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and 15:30 respectively. Both jumps are significant, since the jump to standard error ratios are
11.0 and 7.1.
Interestingly, the effective spread in the first fifteen minutes compared to the rest of the day is
larger than the quoted spread, indicating that market orders bite deep into the probably thin
order book at the start of the day.
3.2 New York
The trades and quotes sample for New York is just like Amsterdam comprised of 261 trading days,
which translate into 6,786 fifteen-minute intervals. The inclusion of seven stocks in the sample
thus yields 47,502 observations. The number of explanatory variables is 26, which is the number
of fifteen-minute intervals in a day.
3.2.1 Volatility
Volatility patterns in New York have the U-shape pattern, apart from excessive volatility in the
first hour of trading as evidenced by the 25% drop in volatility upon the Amsterdam close. In
particular the first fifteen minutes are characterised by very high volatility compared to the rest of
the day. This, in combination with the 50% jump in volatility in Amsterdam suggests that private
information is revealed through the start of trading in New York. Such informed trading continues
through the first hour with relatively high levels of volatility. As soon as Amsterdam closes
volatility drops in New York, although this drop is not as substantial as the 15:30 jump in
Amsterdam. Interestingly, high volatility at literally the last minute of trading in Amsterdam does
not convey the inclusion of new, private information, since New York price discovery for the same
shares does not show a significant jump immediately after the close. On the contrary, it drops at
the close. The statistical significance of the drop is evident from the drop to standard error ratio,
which equals 7.2.
Compared to UK cross-listed stocks, Dutch stocks appear to be more sensitive to
simultaneous price discovery in the domestic market.
3.2.2 Volume
The intraday volume pattern at the NYSE has a shape similar to the volatility pattern. The volume
drop upon the Amsterdam close is 25%. The differences with the pattern for UK stocks are
relatively small, apart from higher volume in the Dutch stocks at the close. The drop is significant,
since the drop to standard error ratio is 10.3.
3.2.3 Quoted Spread
The quoted spread intraday pattern reflects a single-legged “U”. Spreads do not increase at the
end of the day. Contrary to the Amsterdam pattern, there is no threat of new information being
revealed through the start of trading elsewhere. The remarkable difference with the Werner and
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Kleidon finding is the sudden 10% jump in spreads upon the close of trading in Amsterdam.
Spreads in New York seem to be sensitive to the competitive pressure for order flow caused by
simultaneous trade in Amsterdam. Such downward pressure, apparently, dominates the upward
pressure on spreads due to informed trading in the first hour. The alternative explanation is that
extreme volume and volatility at the close in Amsterdam reveals new information that will affect
New York trading afterwards. Informed traders that did not succeed to trade at the close in
Amsterdam redirect their intended trading to New York. This implies that price changes, and
therefore volatility, are large in New York just after the close in Amsterdam. The empirical finding
of a volatility drop, however, makes this explanation less likely. The jump is significant as is
evident in a jump to standard error ratio of 10.3.
3.2.4 Effective Spread
The effective and quoted spread patterns have similar shape. The jump for the effective spread
upon the close of Amsterdam is less pronounced, 5% instead of 10%. It is a significant result,
since the jump to standard error ratio is 5.5. Similar to Amsterdam the effective spreads in the
first fifteen minutes are very large compared to quoted spreads.
The week with no trading overlap due to non-synchronous change to daylight savings time is
studied to evaluate whether the intraday peaks for both markets are caused by the open or close
of the other market. The intraday patterns shift in line with US market opening up one hour later
compared to the other weeks in the sample. The period is too short, however, to find statistically
significant results.
4 Price Discovery in the Overlapping Trading Hour
The increased volume and volatility for the hour of overlap accompanied by higher spreads clearly
reject the hypothesised intraday patterns for perfectly integrated markets. These findings are
consistent with informed trading for this time of day. But if markets are not perfectly integrated as
judged from a full-day perspective, is price discovery then integrated for the overlapping trading
hour? Price differences should be transient for arbitrage reasons. Hence, both price series may be
non stationary, the price difference series should be stationary otherwise prices would drift apart
without bound. The null hypothesis of market integration for price discovery during the overlap is
tested by evaluating whether or not both price series are cointegrated.
If volume is high, prices are volatile, spreads are large indicating informed trading and if
price discovery is integrated, arguably the most interesting question is: in which market does this
new, private information originate? This question is addressed in Hasbrouck (1995). In this paper
an error correction model not only determines which market drives price discovery but also details
the interaction between both markets for each stock.
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To study price discovery in the overlapping hour five minute midquote returns have been
calculated and studied. Midquotes are the preferred proxy for price for two reasons. First, quote
returns are not subject to excessive negative autocorrelation that results from a bid-ask bounce
present in trade price returns. This bias was first documented by Roll (1984). Second, the sample
of quotes is larger than the trade sample. The interval length is fixed at five minutes instead of two
minutes or one minute, because these data were least affected by intervals not containing a quote
and therefore uninformative. To facilitate comparison, the Amsterdam quote series are translated
into dollars using day to day NLG-USD exchange rates. Admittedly, applying interday exchange
rate series to intraday quotes is debatable. The impact on the results, however, is limited for two
reasons. First, if intraday exchange rate returns are not correlated with stock returns, model
estimates are less efficient but not biased. Second, the intraday volatility of the USD-NLG
exchange rate is very small compared to the volatility of midquote returns.
To gain insight in the dynamics of the quote series, auto- and cross-correlations are
summarised in table 3. These statistics provide several clues. Contemporaneous returns show
strong positive correlation, ranging from 0.27 to 0.70. This is a first, strong indication that
markets are integrated, i.e. price discovery reflects the same underlying information. The
significantly positive cross-correlations with either AEX or NYSE lagged five minutes are evidence
of potential lagged response to innovations in price discovery on the other exchange. First order
autocorrelations are also significant although to a lesser extent. The fact that these are either
positive or negative shows that the strong bouncing effect present in trade returns is not evident
in quote returns. Significance of higher order auto- and cross-correlations is scattered, most
dynamics is within one lag.
The correlation pattern in midquote returns is consistent with an error correction model as
presented in Hasbrouck (1995). The positive first order cross-correlations are potentially the
result of ‘error correction’. The model is represented as:
The validity of the model depends on the validity of two assumptions. First, the midquote series
should be integrated of order one and, if this is true, both series should be cointegrated. Dickey-
Fuller test statistics show that both these assumptions are valid for all seven stocks. The
stationarity of the cointegrating relation, which is the difference between the midquotes in
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Amsterdam and New York, ensures that price differences are transient. Hence, markets are
integrated, since differences in prices are temporary. The error correction model helps us detail
this integrated price discovery.
Estimation results are tabulated in table 4. The strong, positive contemporaneous
correlation in the return series is picked up by the model in strong contemporaneous correlations
in the error terms. This implies strong market integration since quotes in both markets move in
the same direction in intervals as short as five minutes. Comparing R2 for both markets shows
that they are higher for New York, indicating that apart from contemporaneous adjustment, New
York innovations depend to a larger extent on historical information. The error correction term is
significant in all models, although sometimes significant for the Amsterdam equation only,
sometimes for the New York equation only, and sometimes for both. For Ahold, KLM and KPN the
error correction term is significantly positive for New York returns, which implies that New York
adjusts to midquote differences with Amsterdam. For Aegon and Philips both Amsterdam and New
York adjust for quote differences. For Royal Dutch and Unilever the error correction mechanism
lets Amsterdam adjust to midquote differences with New York.
Before considering information shares of both exchanges as defined in Hasbrouck (1995),
it is useful to discriminate between long term and transitional contributions to price discovery.
The long-term contribution is a straightforward expression after rewriting the error correction
model to a Vector Moving Average (VMA) model.
The stationarity conditions imply that the sum of all rows in Ψ(1) constitute the long-term impact
of a unit impulse on each of the midquote prices. The cointegration condition ensures that this
sum is equal for both rows. The economic intuition is that prices on both exchanges can differ
only temporarily and will revert to a common implicit price. The arbitrage mechanism brings both
prices in line in the “long-term”.
The first two columns in table 5 document the long-term impact for all seven stocks.
Consistent with the categorisation based on the error correction term, Ahold, KLM and KPN show
that unit impulses in Amsterdam are permanent, whereas unit impulses in New York are
temporary. For Aegon and Philips both unit impulses on Amsterdam and New York appear to have
a permanent effect. Royal Dutch and Unilever in the long run incorporate unit impulses from New
York, not from Amsterdam. Although these conclusions might be too black and white, they do
grasp the main differences.
The transitional properties of the model are best explored by drawing impulse response
functions for all seven stocks. Figures 4a and 4b depict how AEX and NYSE midquotes are
affected by unit impulses on one of the exchanges. The midquote value prior to the unit impulse is
equal to the sample average. The response functions are strikingly similar across all stocks for
tt Lr ε)(Ψ= (4)
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both Amsterdam and New York. At the same time, they are different across both exchanges.
Amsterdam tends to be overreacting to incumbent unit impulses, whereas New York tends to
temper unit impulses originating in its own market. The adjustment process to a unit impulse on
the other exchange is gradual for Amsterdam in reaction to New York, and relatively fast for New
York in reaction to Amsterdam. The adjustment rate is quantified by documenting the time
needed for the responding exchange to incorporate half of the long-term effect. The results in
column 3 and 4 in table 5 show that in New York this takes less than fifteen minutes whereas in
Amsterdam this takes more than one hour. For Royal Dutch and Unilever, New York even
overreacts to an impulse on Amsterdam. These patterns seem to indicate that Amsterdam traders
are confident that quote changes in their own market reflect new, private information, whereas
they slowly adept to the information in New York quote changes. In New York, traders interpret
NYSE quote changes as only partially reflecting new, private information. The immediate
adjustment downwards for all seven stocks supports this interpretation. For some stocks, this is a
valid response since the long-term contribution of New York is nearly zero. For stocks such as
Aegon, Philips, Royal Dutch and Unilever, however, this is not, since within twenty minutes
quotes are adjusted upwards again.
Information shares measure the proportional contribution of innovations in one market to
the innovation in the common implicit price. Hasbrouck (1995) calculates them based on the
error-correction model. By construct, the information share cannot be pinned down to one
number, but is contained in an interval. The lower and upper bound of this interval are tabulated
in table 5 and depicted in figure 5. The intervals are relatively wide largely due to the high
contemporaneous correlation in the error terms. In other words, both markets are integrated to
such an extent that price adjustments take place within five minutes. This hampers the
assignment of new information to Amsterdam or New York. The mere location of the intervals still
is very informative on the relative position of the Amsterdam and New York market. Information
for Ahold, KLM and KPN originates primarily in Amsterdam for the overlapping trading hour.
Information for Aegon and Philips originates in both Amsterdam and New York. Information for
Royal Dutch and Unilever originates primarily in New York. This categorisation is consistent with
the ones based on the error correction term coefficients and the long-term effect of unit impulses.
5 Intraday patterns by category
The intraday price discovery study based on the Hasbrouck model unambiguously shows that the
Amsterdam and New York market are integrated, since they both reflect the same fundamental
information. Such unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn when looked at the origination of
information. The sample can be categorised as Amsterdam led, mixed or New York led stocks. The
first category contains Ahold, KLM and KPN, the second Aegon and Philips and the third Royal
Dutch and Unilever. Based on these findings it is interesting to evaluate whether Amsterdam and
New York trading patterns depend on the category the stock belongs to. To answer this question
the Werner and Kleidon model is extended in the following manner:
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The additional variable Ii(s) is one if stock s belongs to category i and zero otherwise. The
estimation results are tabulated in table 6a and 6b and depicted in figure 6a and 6b. Although
each category is thin, since it contains two or three stocks, the results are remarkable and
patterns differ significantly, in particular at 14:30 (CET) and during the overlapping trading hour.
The Amsterdam intraday patterns for each category do not deviate in shape from the
overall pattern established in section 3, but differ in the size of the jumps throughout the day. The
14:30 effect for the different categories are not significantly different. This is consistent with the
market wide, systematic information contained in the macro economic announcements and the
start of US index futures trading. The 15:30 effects are more substantial the more information
originates in New York. Volatility, quoted and effective spreads show significantly higher jumps
upon the opening of New York.  Volume, however, is not significantly different.
In line with the findings for Amsterdam, the intraday patterns for New York are similar in
shape to the documented overall pattern. Again, the differences are large and significant for
volatility, quoted spread and effective spread patterns. The volatility and effective spread patterns
show that the more information originates in Amsterdam the higher volatility and effective spread
are in the first hour relative to the rest of the day. For these stocks informed trading takes place
primarily in the first hour when Amsterdam is open. The order in the quoted spread pattern is
somewhat different, but this can be explained by quoted spread being a flawed indicator of
liquidity.
6 Conclusion
The question of market integration is increasingly relevant in a world where equity markets see
more and more cross-listings. Werner and Kleidon (1996) study UK stocks cross-listed in New
York and answer this question by documenting intraday patterns in volatility, volume and quoted
spread. In this paper the same methodology is used to estimate these patterns for Dutch stocks
cross-listed in New York. The implicit assumption in Werner and Kleidon (1996) paper is that
their results are robust to differences in market structure. The London Stock Exchange is a dealer
market and NYSE is not. The most interesting variable, the cost of trading, is hard to measure in
a dealer market. Quoted spread, as studied by Werner and Kleidon, is a flawed proxy for cost of
trading, since it is at most indicative. In the electronic market in Amsterdam, on the other hand,
traders are committed to quotes. Hence, quoted spreads are an improved indicator of the cost of
trading. This study also contains an analysis of ex-post, effective spreads to circumvent altogether
the well-documented flaws of quoted spread as a proxy for cost of trading.
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The intraday patterns documented for Dutch stocks are firm and show some pronounced
intraday jumps and drops that are not at all or to a lesser extent present in the Werner and
Kleidon study. The most remarkable jump is at 14:30 CET, the time US macro economic
announcements are published and US index futures trading starts, which reveals US market
sentiment. In Amsterdam, volatility, volume, quoted and effective spread jump 50, 25, 10 and 10
percent respectively. At 15:30 CET NYSE trading starts and this is the start of one hour of
synchronous trade at both sides of the Atlantic. Again, volatility, volume, quoted and effective
spread jump 50, 50, 5 and 5 percent respectively, which suggests a start of informed trading. As
soon as the Amsterdam stock exchange closes, volatility and volume for the Dutch shares drop in
New York by 25 and 25 percent respectively. Remarkable is the jump in quoted and effective
spreads at this time, 10 and 5 percent respectively. Apparently the competitive pressure, felt in
New York during the hour of simultaneously trade with Amsterdam, eases.
These intraday patterns show that both markets are not perfectly integrated in that they
resemble one market open from the Amsterdam start of trading to the New York close. Increased
volatility, volume and spreads during the hour of overlap clearly are not consistent with the
stylised U shape pattern for a single market. The Hasbrouck (1995) model is used to zoom in on
price discovery for the overlapping trading hour. The error correction model clearly documents
market integration, since price changes in both Amsterdam and New York temporarily differ but
converge in the long-term. The adjustment rate is substantially higher for New York responding to
Amsterdam as opposed to Amsterdam responding to New York. The origination of information
differs from stock to stock. For some stocks price discovery is solely based on information
originating in Amsterdam, for some information originates both in Amsterdam and New York and
for some it originates solely in New York. Re-evaluating intraday patterns based on these different
types of stock shows that the overall intraday shape is present in all stocks, but more pronounced
jumps or drops are documented for the stocks where information primarily originates in the other
market.
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Variable Definition
Volatility Volatility is proxied by the squared return for a specific fifteen minute 
interval. Returns are in basispoints. The interval return is calculated as 
the price prevailing at the start of the interval as is inferred from the 
last trade and the prevailing price at the end of the interval. Applying 
these rules without scrutiny will lead to arbitrary results for variance at 
the first fifteen minutes since quoting does not start immediately at the 
open. The first fifteen minute return in the day is linearly extrapolated 
from the x-minute return from the first midquote in the day to the 
prevailing midquote fifteen minutes after the open. 
Volume Volume is calculated as the number of shares traded in a specific fifteen 
minute interval.
Quoted Spread Quoted spread is calculated as the average difference between the best 
bid and ask price in a specific interval. The  spread for a specific fifteen 
minute interval is a weighted average of all prevailing spreads in the 
interval. 
Effective Spread Effective spread is calculated as twice the difference between the 
transaction price and the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask quote. 
Effectively, this spread metric measures ex-post cost of trading. The 
effective spread for a fifteen minutes interval is a weighted average of all 
observed effective spreads in the interval. 
Appendix: Variable Calculations
Aegon Ahold KLM KPN Philips Royal 
Dutch
Unilever
Type of Listing in New York NY reg ADR NY reg ADR NY reg NY reg NY reg
Outstanding Shares (mln)a 380 523 61 272 369 2,144 640
Outstanding New York (mln)a 4 8 12 8 76 859 218
%-age of totala 1% 2% 20% 3% 21% 40% 34%
Market Cap. (NLG bn)a 105 28 6 40 45 239 81
Avg No of Trades per Day AEX 531 872 250 474 709 919 594
Avg No of Trades per Day NYSE 63 52 139 24 337 874 352
Avg No of Quotes per Day AEX 665 916 282 542 1,021 1,111 830
Avg No of Quotes per Day NYSE 91 48 464 37 189 329 322
Aegon Ahold KLM KPN Philips Royal 
Dutch
Unilever
Volatilityb (basispoints2=bp2) AEX 922 1,360 1,284 1,005 1,412 730 581
Volatility  (bp2) NYSE 349 1,519 909 382 841 891 514
Volume (No of Shares) AEX 34,422 88,893 19,706 52,941 77,149 138,665 57,467
Volume (No of shares) NYSE 2,790 1,479 5,929 1,116 23,609 71,871 20,044
Quoted Spread (bp) AEX 23 40 37 32 25 20 18
Quoted Spread (bp) NYSE 51 106 66 90 38 44 19
Effective Spread (bp) AEX 18 26 28 25 18 15 14
Effective Spread (bp) NYSE 19 49 32 35 15 15 13
Number of Observations AEX 7,308 7,308 7,308 7,308 7,308 7,308 7,308
Number of Observations NYSE 6,786 6,786 6,786 6,786 6,786 6,786 6,786
Aegon Ahold KLM KPN Philips Royal 
Dutch
Unilever
Volatilityb (basispoints2=bp2) AEX 1,023 1,617 1,804 1,220 1,772 1,306 967
Volatility (bp2) NYSE 1,169 1,952 1,874 1,026 1,496 1,319 888
Volume AEX 51,968 122,695 32,598 77,523 122,116 228,485 93,636
Volume NYSE 5,055 2,880 10,291 2,359 37,757 120,670 33,275
Quoted Spread (bp) AEX 23 41 36 31 25 21 20
Quoted Spread (bp) NYSE 61 120 84 90 45 47 20
Effective Spread (bp) AEX 20 28 32 27 20 17 16
Effective Spread (bp) NYSE 54 84 60 87 34 17 22
Number of Observations AEX 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Number of Observations NYSE 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Trading at AEX and NYSE
a: as per 1/1/98
b: the first fifteen minutes of trading (9:30-9:45, CET) and the last fifteen minutes of trading (16:15-16:30, CET) 
have been excluded because of extreme volatility
The figures presented in this table are 15 minute averages. They are based on trading on both the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange from July 1, 1997 until and including June 30, 1998. 
Variable definitions are to be found in the appendix. 
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Aegon Ahold KLM KPN Philips Royal 
Dutch
Unilever
Autocorrelations
AEX
5 min ρ(rAEX,rAEX(-1)) 0.052* 0.049* -0.002 0.022 0.119* -0.007 0.070*
10 min ρ(rAEX,rAEX(-2)) 0.015 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.069* -0.032 0.033
15 min ρ(rAEX,rAEX(-3)) 0.031 0.027 0.005 0.039* 0.049* 0.011 0.044*
20 min ρ(rAEX,rAEX(-4)) 0.025 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.043* -0.004 0.032
NYSE
5 min ρ(rNYSE(-1),rNYSE) 0.044* -0.058* -0.069* -0.048* 0.127* 0.001 0.000
10 min ρ(rNYSE(-2),rNYSE) 0.010 -0.009 0.004 -0.012 0.007 -0.067* -0.009
15 min ρ(rNYSE(-3),rNYSE) 0.009 0.009 0.011 -0.004 0.020 -0.008 0.036*
20 min ρ(rNYSE(-4),rNYSE) 0.027 -0.028 -0.027 0.002 0.061* 0.003 0.019
Contemporaneous correlations
0 lags ρ(rAEX,rNYSE) 0.463* 0.273* 0.411* 0.286* 0.593* 0.700* 0.612*
Cross correlations
NYSE lagged
5 min ρ(rAEX,rNYSE(-1)) 0.030 0.016 0.060* 0.011 0.137* 0.086* 0.079*
10 min ρ(rAEX,rNYSE(-2)) 0.018 0.010 -0.010 -0.014 0.032* -0.031 -0.037*
15 min ρ(rAEX,rNYSE(-3)) 0.027 -0.023 -0.001 0.000 0.054* -0.007 0.005
20 min ρ(rAEX,rNYSE(-4)) 0.042* 0.013 0.000 -0.003 0.022 0.000 -0.009
AEX lagged
5 min ρ(rAEX(-1),rNYSE) 0.308* 0.250* 0.159* 0.212* 0.326* 0.079* 0.124*
10 min ρ(rAEX(-2),rNYSE) 0.088* 0.073* 0.034 0.089* 0.065* -0.037* 0.016
15 min ρ(rAEX(-3),rNYSE) 0.051* 0.057* 0.038* 0.040* 0.040* 0.005 0.015
20 min ρ(rAEX(-4),rNYSE) 0.037* 0.035 0.013 0.034 0.051* -0.009 0.030*
*: Significant at a 95% significance level
Table 3: Correlations Midquote Returns during Overlap 
This table contains the auto- and cross-correlations for the 5 minute midquote return series for 
the 1 hour period of simultaneous trading in Amsterdam and New York. Midquotes are based on 
best bid ask quotes on both the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange 
from July 1, 1997 until and including June 30, 1998.
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Aegon 0.8 0.6 10 min 50 min 39 - 89 11 - 61
Ahold 1.2 0.0 20 min NR 89 - 100 0 - 11
KLM 0.9 0.2 10 min NR 66 - 98 3 - 34
KPN 1.0 0.1 15 min NR 81 - 99 1 - 19
Philips 0.9 0.8 5 min 65 min 30 - 88 12 - 70
Royal Dutch 0.0 1.1 NR 70 min 0 - 54 46 - 100
Unilever -0.3 1.4 NR 75 min 4 - 21 79 - 96
AEX NYSE
Long Term Effect (LTE) 
of  a Unit Impulse 
Information ShareTime Needed to Incorporate 
Half the  LTE
NR: not relevant, since long term effect to a unit impulse is negligble.
This table documents (i) the long term effect of a unit impulse in the midquote on both exchanges, (ii) the 
adjustment rate of the other exchange to this impulse and (iii) the information share of each of the 
exchanges. 
(i) The long term effect is the contribution of a unit impulse to the common efficient price. 
(ii) The adjustment rate is defined as the time needed by the other exchange to incorporate half of the long 
term effect.
(iii) The last four columns contain intervals that include the information share of each exchange in the 
overlapping trading hour. The construct ’information share’ is developed in Hasbrouck (1995). It is defined 
as the proportional contribution of a market’s innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. 
The long term effect, adjustment rate and information share are calculated based on Vector Autoregressive 
Model (VAR) estimations for 5 minute midquote returns. Midquotes are based on best bid ask quotes on 
both the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange from July 1, 1997 until and 
including June 30, 1998.
Table 5: Long Term Contribution to Price Discovery Process
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Figure 1: Non-US companies listed at NYSE
This graph depicts the number of non-US companies with common stock listed on the NYSE from 1956 
through 1998. Soure: NYSE
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Figure 2: Stylized Intraday Pattern
The thick solid black line traces out the stylized U-shape pattern for volatility, trading volume, and 
percentage quoted and effective spreads.
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The thick solid black line traces out the elongated U-shape that is the predicted intraday pattern for 
volatility, trading volume, percentage quoted and effective spreads under the hypothesis that Amsterdam 
and New York trading of Dutch cross-listed stocks is perfectly integrated. The thin solid black lines trace 
out two U-shaped curves that represent the predicted intraday patterns for each market under the 
alternative hypothesis that trading of Dutch cross-listed stocks is not perfectly integrated.
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Figure 4a: Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions show the average response to a unit shock to the midquote on one of the 
exchanges. The midquote value prior to the shock equals the average sample midquote in dollars. The 
functions are drawn based on the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) estimations for 5 minute midquote 
returns. The sample is restricted to the one hour period of simultaneous trade in Amsterdam and New York. 
Midquotes are based on best bid ask quotes on both the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the New York 
Stock Exchange from July 1, 1997 until and including June 30, 1998.
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Figure 4b: Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions show the average response to a unit shock to the midquote on one of the 
exchanges. The midquote value prior to the shock equals the average sample midquote in dollars. The 
functions are drawn based on the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) estimations for 5 minute midquote 
returns. The sample is restricted to the one hour period of simultaneous trade in Amsterdam and New York. 
Midquotes are based on best bid ask quotes on both the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the New York 
Stock Exchange from July 1, 1997 until and including June 30, 1998.
Figure 5: Information Shares
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This figure depicts the information share of each exchange in the overlapping trading hour. The 
construct ’information share’ is developed in Hasbrouck (1995). It is defined as the proportional 
contribution of a market’s innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price. It is calculated 
using the the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) estimations for 5 minute midquote returns. Midquotes 
are based on best bid ask quotes on both the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the New York Stock 
Exchange from July 1, 1997 until and including June 30, 1998.
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